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This paper examines empirically the effects of multiple banking relationships on the 
cost and availability of credit. The analysis is based on an unbalanced panel data set for 
Japanese small and medium-sized firms over the period 2000-2002. The 
Hausman-Taylor estimator is used to allow for possible correlation between 
unobservable heterogeneity among firms and multiple banking relationships. The 
results suggest that the cost of credit is positively correlated with the number of 
banking relationships when the endogeneity of the banking relationships is considered. 
Multiple banking relationships have a positive effect on the availability of credit for 
financially constrained firms.     
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1. Introduction 
 
Relational banking plays an important role in overcoming credit constraints for small 
businesses. In the presence of informational asymmetry, adverse selection and moral 
hazard can lead to credit rationing – a problem that can be overcome by banking 
relationships, which, over time, help the bank to obtain information on the borrowing 
firm’s unobservable qualities and thus mitigate credit rationing. A growing body of 
theoretical literature examines the costs and benefits of banking relationships, 
suggesting that long-term exclusive banking relationships can relax the credit 
constraints of less well-known firms. On the other hand, such relationships potentially 
allow banks to extract rent by exploiting the informational monopoly power they 
possess over a firm if the quality of the firm is good but unobservable and the firm has 
good investment opportunities (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992; von Thadden 1995). At the 
same time, however, informationally opaque firms with a single banking relationship 
are vulnerable to liquidity shocks to their first bank: unable to borrow from their 
preferred bank, such businesses may be unable to obtain financing from other, 
non-relational banks, which fear they might be dealing with a “lemon” (Detragiache, 
Garella, and Guiso 2000). Thus, in order to ensure stable financing, firms of both good 
and bad quality typically choose multiple sources, i.e. they enter multiple banking 
relationships.  
A growing number of empirical studies, using cross-section data on small and 
medium-sized firms, explore the effect of multiple banking relationships on the cost and 
availability of credit. However, most of these studies do not consider the endogeneity of 
banking relationships and credit contract terms. When the information obtained 
through relationships is not easily transferred to outsiders and unobservable firm 
quality determines the number of banking relationships and the credit cost and 
availability, the banking relationships and the credit contract terms become endogenous. 
Determinants of unobservable firm quality are factors such as managerial ability, firms’ 
reputation, or positive net investment opportunities that are often not fully captured by 
the observable data. The treatment of unobserved firm quality is particularly important 
when we use data on small and medium-sized firms since less observable and audited 
information is available for them than for listed companies.   
This paper reexamines the costs and benefits of multiple banking relationships using a 
panel data set for Japanese small and medium-sized firms for the period 2000-2002. 
This paper differs from preceding studies in three ways. First, unobserved firm 
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unobservable heterogeneous firm characteristics and banking relationships are 
considered. Second, financially constrained firms are singled out by estimating a 
disequilibrium model that allows for credit rationing, and the relationship between the 
nature of the banking relationship and credit availability is investigated. This approach 
differs from previous studies in that the latter define firms as financially constrained if 
they rely on other expensive external financial sources that are substitutes for bank 
credit. The third aspect in which this paper differs from previous studies on Japan is 
that it concentrates on small and medium-sized firms, while most preceding analyses 
have focused on bank-firm relationships  among  listed  firms.     
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous 
theoretical and empirical studies and highlights their shortcomings. Section 3 describes 
the basic estimation strategy and our sample data. Section 4 presents the results of the 
estimation of the effect of banking relationships on the cost of credit. Section 5 presents 
the investigation into the effect of multiple banking relationships on the availability of 
credit for financially constrained firms. Section 6 concludes.   
 
 
2.  The effect of multiple banking relationships on credit cost and availability: theory 
and evidence 
 
This section reviews what the theoretical literature has to say on the costs and benefits 
of multiple banking relationships, focusing on the effect of relationships on the pricing 
and availability of credit. It also discusses previous empirical studies on these issues 
relating to small and medium-sized firms.1, 2  
 
2.1 The cost and availability of credit and multiple banking relationships: Theoretical 
considerations 
 
From a theoretical point of view, multiple relationship banking can have both 
advantages and disadvantages, both of which are related to the fact that relationship 
                                                  
1  A survey of more general issues regarding relationship banking is provided by Boot 
(2000). 
2  This paper restricts itself to a discussion of multiple banking relationships, however 
the strength of banking relationships are measured in various ways: the duration of a 
bank-firm relationship (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Cole 1998; Degryse and Van 
Cayseele 2000) and the number of different services the firm purchases from the bank 
(Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000). 
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banking relationship over multiple ones is that it can save overall monitoring costs 
(Diamond 1984) and transaction costs. On the other hand, the cost of a single banking 
relationship is that the single relationship bank may use its monopoly information and 
extract future rents (the “hold-up problem”) (Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992; von Thadden 
1995). In this environment, small and medium-sized firms that heavily rely on bank 
finance can protect themselves from such a hold-up problem by establishing a second 
banking relationship. 
Multiple banking relationships also have conflicting implications with regard to 
credit availability. In the presence of information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers, adverse selection and moral hazard can lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1981). Thus, firms are unable to obtain all the credit they demand at the going 
market interest rate. Adverse selection problems are particularly severe in the market 
for small business financing. In this case, exclusive and long-term banking 
relationships can mitigate credit rationing since relationship banks internalize the 
benefits of subsidizing firms over time. At the same time, however, firms with a single 
banking relationship are more at risk of not being able to obtain additional credit if 
their bank refuses to provide it, because non-relational banks are likely to suspect that 
the firm is a lemon (due to the adverse selection problem). Possible reasons why a firm’s 
single bank might refuse to provide additional credit are that the firm’s quality is 
revealed to be bad or the bank itself faces a liquidity problem of its own. Therefore, 
anticipating adverse selection problems, both good and bad quality firms may choose to 
engage in multiple banking relationships to ensure stable access to finance. 
 
2.2 The cost and availability of credit and multiple banking relationships: Empirical 
evidence 
 
The empirical literature has produced mixed results regarding the effects of intensive 
banking relations on the cost and availability of loans. Using U.S small firm data, 
Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) find that a higher concentration in banking 
relationships leads to lower borrowing costs and less credit rationing. Harhoff and 
Körting (1998), using survey data for small and medium-sized German firms with no 
more than 500 employees, find no correlation between the cost of debt and the number 
of relationship banks; however, firms with multiple banking relationships face more 
credit rationing than those with a single banking relationship. These studies provide 
evidence to support the hypothesis that an exclusive banking relationship provides a 
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banks to obtain rents in the future (von Thadden 1995). In contrast with these results, 
D’Auria, Foglia, and Reedtz (1999), using data on Italian firms, find a negative 
relationship between the interest rate of loans and the number of banking relationships. 
However, what all these studies have in common is that they treat multiple banking 
relationships as exogenously given and regress credit cost and availability on banking 
relationship variables. Yet, if relationship variables capture unobserved firm 
characteristics, such as managers’ ability or firms’ quality, and credit contract terms are 
also determined by the firms’ unobservable characteristics, then the relationship 
variables and credit cost and availability are endogenous and the estimated coefficients 
are biased. For example, when firms of unobservable high quality choose multiple 
banking relationships to counter potential opportunistic behavior by banks, the banking 
relationships and cost of credit are both determined by the firm’s quality and become 
endogenous.  
 Some studies investigate what determines a firm’s choice of number of banking 
relationships. Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) address this question by 
developing a model in which a firm with a good investment opportunity establishes 
multiple banking relationships from the start in order to avoid the risk of financing 
difficulties should a single bank run into liquidity problems. Using cross-section data for 
small and medium-sized Italian manufacturing firms, the authors then test the model 
and find that the number of banking relationships is positively correlated with the 
fragility of banks. Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001), using data set on Argentinean 
firms, find that small firms choose multiple banking relationships over a single banking 
relationship as a reaction to bank distress even though this increases their cost of credit. 
Cosci and Meliciani (2002), using data provided by a large Italian bank, find that the 
number of banking relationships is positively correlated with a firm’s leverage and the 
riskiness of the sector in which the firm operates. All these studies find that firms’ 
quality and the fragility of their primary bank determine the firms’ choice of the 
number of banking relationships. 
Credit cost and availability are affected by other factors besides multiple banking 
relationships. Focusing on the effect of local credit market competition on lending 
relationships, Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that banks are more likely to extend 
credit to financially constrained firms in a concentrated credit market because they can 
expect future monopoly rents. The authors support their hypothesis with evidence 
based on U.S. small and medium-sized firm data. On the other hand, Tsuruta (2004), 
using panel data for Japanese small and medium-sized firms, finds that credit market 
 4competition does not affect the loan interest rate.         
 
 
3.    Econometric procedure and data   
 
3.1 Econometric procedure 
 
Assuming that a firm chooses the number of banking relationships optimally so as to 
maximize profits in the presence of informational asymmetry, multiple banking 
relationships and the cost and availability of credit are determined by the firm’s 
unobservable quality and become endogenous. Moreover, assuming that information on 
firms’ quality is obtained through relationship banking, and this information is not 
easily transferred to or verifiable by outsiders of the relation, it is also unobservable for 
an econometrician. In the analysis that follows, it is therefore assumed that firms’ 
unobservable quality and banking relationships are constant over time.   
 Based on previous theoretical and empirical studies it is assumed that a firm’s cost of 
credit is determined by its observable and unobservable characteristics, credit market 
competition, and its banking relationships. Observable characteristics, such as firm size, 
firms’ default risk, the industry in which they operate, their legal status and other 
characteristics are discussed in detail in the next section. The unobservable 
characteristics capture firm quality such as managerial ability, firm reputation or 
investment opportunities. These determinants of firm quality are usually unobservable 
and are not fully captured by the observable characteristics proxied by income 
statement and balance sheet variables. The credit market competition variable is 
included to control for variations in the loan rate in local credit markets.     
The baseline empirical model of the determinants of the cost of credit can be written 
as follows: 
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where    is the cost of credit for firm i  in  year  . Firms’ observable 
characteristics consist of time-variant and time-invariant variables and their effects on 
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 5relationships are assumed to be constant over time, while credit market competition is 
assumed to be changing over time. The disturbance term u  is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with all of the explanatory variables and   and has zero mean and 
constant variance   conditional on all of the explanatory variables besides  . If 
 is correlated with some of the explanatory variables such as the bank relationship 
variables and firm characteristics, random effects will produce inconsistent estimators 
of all parameters. Although a traditional remedy for this problem is to use a fixed effects 
estimator, all time-invariant variables are eliminated and   cannot be estimated. To 

























For expositional simplicity, the equation above can be represented as follows:   
, u Cost it i it + + + α δ Z   (1) 
where    represents time-variant firm characteristics and local credit market 
competition in year   .   stands for time-invariant firm characteristics and firms’ 
banking relationships. The unobservable firm heterogeneity   is   and 
disturbance term    is assumed to be uncorrelated with the columns of   and 
has zero mean and constant variance  conditional  on  and  . 










0 ) | ≠ i α
The estimation procedure of the HT estimator is as follows.   and  are 
partitioned as   and  .  and  are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with  , whereas  and  are assumed to be correlated with  . 
it X
) , 2 1 it it it X X X ) , ( 2 1 i i i Z Z Z =
2 i Z
it X
2 it X i α
 6For estimation, a two-step estimation procedure is used. First, consistent estimates of 
  are taken from the within-groups estimation of (1). Second    is substituted into a 
between-group version of (1) to obtain   
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3.2 Sample data   
 
The data used in this study are taken from JADE (Japanese Accounts and Data on 
Enterprises), which is a combination of the databases of Teikoku Databank and Bureau 
van Dijk and covers over 100,000 major Japanese firms including small and medium- 
sized firms. For this study, small and medium-sized firms are selected based on the 
definition of the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law, according to which small and 
medium-sized firms are defined as firms with capital of up to 300 million yen or up to 
300 employees. In the case of the wholesale industry, small and medium-sized firms are 
defined as firms with capital of up to 100 million yen or up to 100 employees, and in the 
retail industry as enterprises with capital of up to 50 million yen or up to 50 employees. 
Since firms’ number of employees varies over time, firms in this study are chosen on the 
basis of their data for 2002. Moreover, since information on firms’ banks is provided only 
for the last period surveyed (year 2002), the sample is taken for the period 2000-2002 to 
minimize the effect of changes in banking relationships.   
 
3.3 Variables   
 
Independent variable 
The cost of credit is expressed as the percentage point spread between the interest 
rate paid by the firm and short-term prime rate to control for changes in the underlying 
cost of credit. A positive spread indicates that the firm has to pay an additional risk 
premium. The interest rate is calculated as the interest paid divided by the total 
outstanding loan amount (expressed in %). Data for the short-term prime rate is taken 
from the Financial and Economics Statistics Monthly issued by the Bank of Japan.     
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Firm characteristics 
As for time-variant firm characteristics, the logarithm of total assets and the current 
assets/current liabilities ratio are included as proxies for firms’ default risk. The 
interpretation of these variables is that larger firms and firms with a high current 
assets/current liabilities ratio are less risky. Sales growth is included in order to control 
for the different investment opportunities firms face. The expected sign of this variable 
is negative. Log (1+firm age) and log (1+firm age)2  are included to take account of 
possible non-linear firm age effects. The expected sign of log (1+firm age) is negative 
because younger firms tend to be relatively informationally opaque and therefore pay 
higher interest rates on their loans. The tangible fixed assets/total assets ratio is 
included as a proxy for collateral. The expected sign of this variable is negative. To 
mitigate the skewness of the distribution of the financial data, the lower and upper 1% 
tails of the distribution are trimmed. As for time-invariant firm characteristics, a 
dummy that takes one if a firm is incorporated and zero otherwise and a stock listing 
dummy that equals one if a firm’s stock is traded at the stock market and zero otherwise 
are included as proxies for risk. Industry dummies are also included to control for 
variations across industries.   
 
Banking relationship variables 
The sample firms obtain credit from two different types of banks: non-government 
banks and government-affiliated financial institutions. It is assumed that the nature of 
relationships with non-government banks is different from that with 
government-affiliated financial institutions. Since the latter are supposed to function as 
the so-called “last resort”, credit-rationed firms are likely to obtain finance from 
government-affiliated financial institutions at low interest rates that do not reflect their 
true default risk. To isolate the effect of non-government banking relationships on the 
cost of credit, the number of firms’ banking relationships is calculated by including only 
non-government banks, of which there are several types: city banks, regional and 
second-tier regional banks, credit associations, and credit coops. To take account of the 
government-affiliated financial institutions effect, a dummy variable is included that 
takes one if the firm borrows from one of the government-affiliated financial 
institutions for small business (Shoko Chukin Bank, Japan Finance Corporation for 
Small Business, and National Life Finance Corporation) and zero otherwise. Also 
included is a dummy for city banks that takes one if the borrower’s main bank is a city 
bank because the interest rate charged by city banks tends to be lower than that 
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length of banking relationships, an issue that has been investigated in some of the 
previous studies.   
 
Credit market competition 
In order to control for variations in lending rates attributable to the degree of 
competition in the different regional loan markets, a measure of bank concentration in 
the local credit market is included. The measure is defined as the lending share of the 
three largest banks in the prefecture where the firm is headquartered. Data on the 
credit market share is obtained from three different sources: the Kinyu Map published 
by the Financial Journal Co., the Kinyu published by Japanese Bankers Associations, 
and the Zenkoku Shinyokinko Zaimu Shohyo published by Kinyu Tosho Consultant Co. 
Prefecture dummies are also included to control for time-constant variations across 
regional credit markets.   
 
Summary statistics of the variables used in this study are presented in table 1.A. The 
industry distribution of observations is shown in table 1.B. The lower and upper 1% 
tails of the distribution of the financial variables are trimmed to eliminate outliers. 
After eliminating observations with incomplete or erroneous data, there are 78,695 
firm-year observations (34,330 firms).   
 
[Insert Tables 1.A and 1.B] 
 
 
In order to partition explanatory variables into exogenous and endogenous ones 
described in the HT procedure, it is examined whether the variables are latent-choice 
variables or have a correlation with unobservable firm characteristics such as 
managerial ability. Firms’ characteristics such as total assets and firm age, the current 
assets/current liabilities ratio, and credit market competition are considered as 
exogenous variables  , while firms’ time-invariant characteristics such as firms’ 
legal form, stock market listing status, industry dummies, and prefecture dummies are 
represented by Z .    contains the tangible fixed assets ratio and other proxy 
variables for firms’ quality.   contains the banking relationship variables, i.e. the 
1 it X
it X 1 i 2
2 i Z
 9number of banking relationships and the dummy for government-affiliated financial 
institutions for small business. The city bank dummy is treated as a time-invariant 
exogenous variable since city banks have few branch offices in local credit markets and 
since whether a firm can obtain credit from a city bank is partly determined by local 
credit market conditions.   
 
3.4 Specification tests 
 
Prior to estimating equation (1) by the HT procedure, the validity of the exogeneity 
condition is tested using the Hausman test based on the difference between the within 
and the random estimator. The specification test statistics are presented in table 2. The 
test statistic is 1165.43 which is distributed as χ2 (8) and is significant at the 1% level. 
The highly significant test statistics indicate that   is correlated with some of the 
explanatory variables and a random effects model is inappropriate.   
i α
Next, the null hypothesis of no correlation between   and   and between   
and   in the HT model specification is tested using the Hausman test based on the 
difference between the within and the HT estimator. The test statistic in the last row of 
table 2 (χ
i α 1 it X i α
1 i Z
2 (3) =5.51) indicates that the exogeneity assumption of some of the 
explanatory variables is valid and supports the HT specification.   
 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
 
4.1 The cost of credit 
 
The estimation results are presented in table 2. Each regression includes year dummies 
to control for time series variation. The base line equation is labeled as Model I. The 
coefficient on the number of banking relationships is positive and significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that multiple banking is costly. The coefficient on the dummy for 
borrowing from government-affiliated banks is negative and highly significant. This 
result is consistent with the notion that the government-affiliated financial institutions
can set the interest rate at a lower level than the non-government banks and that small 
and medium-sized firms who can borrow from government-affiliated financial 
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non-government banks. The significant negative relationships (at the 1% level) between 
the interest rate and log (total assets) as well as the current assets/current liabilities 
ratio imply that larger and less risky firms can get access to cheaper credit. The 
coefficient on the tangible fixed assets/total assets ratio is negative and significant at 
the 1% level. Firms can borrow at a lower interest rate when they have more tangible 
assets for collateral. Contrary to expectation, the coefficient on the firm age variable is 
positive. The coefficient on the dummy indicating whether a firm is incorporated is 
negative, but statistically insignificant. Finally, the coefficient on the stock listing 
dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms listed on the 
stock market are charged a lower risk premium.   
 
4.2 Controlling for firms’ observable quality 
 
It may be argued that the variable on the number of banking relationships captures the 
effect of firm quality that is uncontrolled for in the estimation above. In other words, the 
observed positive correlation between the cost of credit and the number of banking 
relationships may be due to omitted variables that are possibly correlated with the 
banking relationship variable. One possible scenario is that the higher cost of credit of 
firms engaged in multiple banking relationships is a reflection of the quality of those 
firms as only lower-quality firms would engage in multiple banking relationships to 
avoid the liquidation of an ongoing project in case the primary bank denies refinancing 
for the project (Petersen and Rajan 1994). To test this hypothesis, the observable 
time-varying quality of the firm is controlled for by including the operating 
profit/interest ratio (interest coverage ratio) and a financial distress dummy that takes 
one if a firm was in financial distress within the last three years. Lagged values of the 
interest coverage ratio are used to avoid simultaneity problems. The expected sign for 
the interest coverage ratio variable is negative, while that for the financial distress 
dummy is positive. This estimation is labeled Model II and the results are displayed in 
table 2. The coefficients on the interest coverage ratio and the financial distress dummy 
show the expected signs and are significant at the 1% and the 10% level, respectively. 
When a firm generates sufficient profits to pay the interest on its loans, the cost of 
credit is lower. However, firms that experienced financial distress in the preceding three 
years face lower credit costs. The estimation results on the banking relationship 
variables hold even when the quality of the firm is controlled for. The results of the 
other variables also remain unchanged.   
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4.3 Credit market competition   
 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that banks in concentrated credit markets charge 
lower interest rates than their counterparts in competitive credit markets because they 
can expect future monopoly rents. If firms in competitive credit markets have more 
banking relationships than those in less competitive credit markets, i.e., if firms’ choice 
of the number of banking relationships is affected by the degree of competition in the 
credit market, then the positive result for the correlation between the cost of credit and 
the number of banking relationships found above may reflect a spurious correlation. To 
eliminate the possibility of such spurious correlation, the third model estimated 
includes the variable on the degree of competition in the credit market. The results, 
shown in table 2, indicate that the coefficient on the credit concentration variable is 
positive but not significant. The estimation results on the banking relationship 
variables and other variables remain unchanged. This result shows that the number of 
banking relationships is not a proxy for the degree of competition in local credit 
m a r k e t s .             
In sum, the estimation of Models I, II, and III suggest that multiple banking 
relationships are costly in terms of the interest rate borrowers need to pay and this 
result is robust when firms’ quality and credit market competition are controlled for. 
Therefore, the question naturally arises as to why firms establish multiple banking 
relationships despite the costs?       
 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
 
5. Credit availability   
 
In this section, the effect of multiple banking relationships on credit availability is 
investigated. Why do firms establish multiple banking relationships despite the costs? 
One way to think about this is to consider a firm with a profitable investment 
opportunity that requires capital in several tranches. Under these circumstances, a firm 
with a single banking relationship is more at risk of having to liquidate the project if the 
bank refuses to provide credit at a later stage. Given this risk, the cost of credit is a 
relatively minor consideration. Unfortunately, information on whether firms have been 
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effect of multiple banking relationships on access to credit for financially constrained 
firms. The reason for focusing on financially constrained firms is that, all else being 
equal, the effect of banking relationships on credit availability is relevant only for 
financially constrained firms. This paper singles out constrained firms by estimating a 
disequilibrium model.3  The estimation strategy in this part of the analysis is as follows. 
First, the sample is partitioned into credit constrained and unconstrained firms by 
estimating a disequilibrium model that allows for credit rationing. Next, the effect of 
banking relationships is estimated for credit constrained firms. 
 
5.1 A disequilibrium model 
 
A disequilibrium model with unknown sample separation, as described by Maddala 
(1983), is employed. 
The disequilibrium model consists of the demand equation, supply equation and 






















it it Loan Loan Min Loan , =    (transaction  equation). 
d
it Loan  denotes the amount of bank credit demanded by firm   in period t ,   
denotes the maximum amount of credit available to firm   in  period t , and   is 
the realized amount of bank credit. Following the example of Ogawa and Suzuki (2000) 
and Atanasova and Wilson (2004), the amount of bank credit demanded is modeled as a 
function of the level or the expansion of firm activity, firm size, other sources of capital 
that are substitutes to bank loans, and the cost of bank credit. The maximum amount of 





                                                  
3  Previous studies using data on small and medium-sized firms in the U.S. define firms 
as constrained when they fall behind in their repayment of trade credits, because trade 
credits become the most expensive source of capital if repaid after the due date.   
 
 13In the demand equation, the level of firm activity is measured by sales, and substitutes 
for bank loans are proxied by cash flow and net trade credit. Net trade credit is 
calculated as the differences between notes payable trade plus accounts payable trade 
and notes receivable trade plus debtors’ accounts receivable trade. The expected sign of 
the firm activity variable is positive because firms’ demand for cash increases with the 
expansion of their business activities (the transaction cost motive for demanding cash). 
The expected signs of the variables for bank loan substitutes are negative. The cost of 
bank credit is expressed as the percentage point spread between the interest rate paid 
by the firm and short-term prime rate and is expected to have a negative effect on loan 
demand. Sales growth is included to control for firms’ investment opportunities.   
 In the supply equation, firms’ collateral is measured by tangible fixed assets and total 
assets. Firms’ default risk is measured by the ability to pay interest and the ability to 
pay short-term debt. The former is represented by the operating profit/interest ratio, 
while the latter is represented by the current assets/current liabilities ratio. A high 
operating profit/interest ratio or a high current assets/current liabilities ratio indicates 
that the default risk is low. Therefore, the expected signs of collateral variable and 
variables indicating the ability to pay interest are all positive. All level variables are 
divided by total assets to reduce heteroscedasticity. Thus, the size effect of   in the 
demand function above is estimated as a constant term, while the constant term   is 
estimated as a coefficient of the reciprocal of total assets. The same logic is applied to 
the collateral effect of total assets and the constant term in the supply function. Both 
equations contain log (GDP) to control for macroeconomic conditions. To control for 
unobservable firm-fixed effects, first differences of the equations are estimated. In this 
way, banking relationships that might affect the maximum amount of credit available to 
firms are also eliminated. Other time-constant firm characteristics such as firms’ legal 
status and industry specific effects that might affect the demand equation are also 
eliminated. To take first differences, data for the year 1999 is also used. The 
first-differenced variables are again truncated at the lower and upper 1% tails of the 
distribution and the total number of firm-year observations is 70,171. The model is 





  The estimation results are presented in table 3. The coefficients in the supply equation 
show the expected sign and are highly significant. Firms with more collateral, as 
measured by the tangible fixed asset/total assets ratio, obtain more credit. The results 
for the operating profit/interest ratio and the current assets/current liabilities ratio 
suggest that firms’ ability to pay interest and short-term debt is also an important 
 14determining factor of loan availability besides collateral. In the demand equation, the 
coefficients on the cash flow/total assets ratio and on the net trade credit/total assets 
ratio have the expected sign and are significant at the 1% level. Firms with a larger 
internal cash flow and greater other outside financial resources have a lower demand 
for bank loans. The coefficient on the percentage point spread between the loan interest 
rate paid by the firm and the short-term prime rate shows the expected sign and is 
highly significant. Contrary to expectation, the estimated coefficient on the sales/total 
assets ratio has a negative sign. The negative and significant coefficient on the sales 
growth variable suggests that growing firms generate greater internal cash flow and 
therefore have a lower demand for bank loans. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
5.2 Credit availability   
 
Next, the investigation turns to the effect of multiple banking relationships on the 
availability of credit for credit-constrained firms. Based on the results obtained in the 
previous section, a firm is defined as financially constrained in year    if the probability 
that the desired amount of bank credit in year t  exceeds the maximum amount of 
credit available in the same year is greater than 0.5. Following Gersovitz (1980), the 
probability that firm    will face a financial constraint in year    is derived as follows: 
t
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where   and   denote the variables that determine firms’ loan demand and the 
maximum amount of credit available to firms, respectively. The error terms are 
assumed to be distributed normally,  , and    is a standard normal 
distribution function. Since  and  , 
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Over the whole sample period 2000-2002, the average proportion of financial 
constrained firms is 39.75%.   
  Next, using only the sample of financially constrained firms, the effect of banking 
 15relationships on credit availability is estimated. Conditional on the demand of credit, 
the availability of credit is determined by firms’ collateral, default risk, other firm 
characteristics, banking relationships, credit market competition, and firms’ 
unobservable characteristics. Although the observed amount of bank credit should be on 
the supply curve since the firms are liquidity constrained and fail to obtain the desired 
amount of bank credit, demand factors for loans are also included to lessen the 
identification problems.   
The estimated equation is as follows: 
. u iables Control
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stics characteri Firm risk Default Collateral LOAN
it i it
it i
i it it it
+ + +
+ +
+ + + =
α β
β β
β β β β
癡 6
5 4
3 2 1 0
  
The equation is estimated using the Hausman-Taylor method. The dependent variable 
is the total outstanding loan amount/total assets *100. Firms’ collateral is measured by 
the tangible fixed assets/total assets ratio, while the firms’ default risk is measured by 
the current assets/current liabilities ratio, the operating profit/interest ratio, and the 
financial distress dummy. Log (1+firm age) and log (1+firm age)2  are included as 
proxies for firms’ informational opaqueness. Time-invariant firm characteristics, bank 
relationship characteristics, and credit market competition are represented by the same 
variables in table 2. The predicted value of the loan demand calculated from the 
previous estimation is used as a measure of the demand for loans. Log (total assets) and 
debt/total assets are also included to control for firms’ size effect and debt capacity, 
respectively. Year dummies are also included. Firms’ unobservable characteristics are 
captured by  , which is assumed to be  . The disturbance term   is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with all of the explanatory variables and   and has zero 
mean and constant variance    conditional on all of the explanatory variables besides 
. The predicted demand, the tangible fixed assets ratio, the interest coverage ratio, 
and the distress dummy are assumed to be endogenous time-variant variables, while 
banking relationship variables such as the number of banking relationships and the 
dummy for government-affiliated financial institutions for small business are assumed 
to be endogenous time-invariant variables; the rest of the variables are assumed to be 
exogenous.  
i α ) , ( IID





 16  The results of the estimation are presented in table 4. The base line model is labeled 
Model IV. The coefficient on the number of banking relationships in Model IV is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. Among financially constrained firms, those with 
multiple banking relationships obtain more credit. This result implies that multiple 
banking relationships relax firms’ credit constraints. On the other hand, the coefficient 
on the dummy for borrowing from government-affiliated banks, unexpectedly, is 
negative and significant, implying that firms which borrow from government-affiliated 
banks obtain less credit than those that do not. A possible explanation of this 
unexpected result is that the dummy for borrowing from government-affiliated banks 
may partly capture firms’ observable quality, since it is low quality firms that tend to 
apply for loans from government-affiliated banks as a “last resort” and the coefficient on 
the measures of firms’ risk of default (the operating profit/interest ratio and the distress 
dummy) show the predicted signs but are insignificant. The negative and significant 
coefficient on the dummy indicating whether the first bank is a city bank is consistent 
with the large-bank barriers hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that large banks have 
difficulties in establishing lending relationships with small and medium-sized firms 
because of organizational diseconomies and organizational hierarchical structures that 
put large banks at a disadvantage when it comes to gathering soft information (Berger 
and Udell 2002; Stein 2002).   
The coefficient on the tangible assets ratio is highly significant and positive, as 
expected. This result suggests that credit constraints are lessened when firms have 
more collateral. The positive and significant coefficient on the current assets/current 
liabilities assets ratio indicates that more bank credit is available when firms’ ability to 
repay short-term debt is higher. The coefficients on the log (1+firm age) and the log 
(1+firm age)2  are positive and negative, respectively, and both of them are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. There results suggest that young firms have difficulties in 
obtaining enough credit because of their informational opaqueness, on the other hand, 
old firms have also difficulties in obtaining funds since they have less good investment 
opportunities.  
Controlling for credit market competition (Model V), the results for the banking 
relationship variables remain virtually unchanged. The coefficient on the credit market 
concentration variable is positive, but statistically insignificant.   
Finally, in order to examine the effect that bank fragility might have on the 
availability of credit, a variable representing the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of 
firms’ first bank is included (Model VI). Data on NPL ratios are taken from the Bank 
Financial Statement Data published by Nikkei Quick data service. The results suggest 
 17that banks’ fragility, as indicated by the NPL ratio, has a significant negative effect on 
the availability of credit. Again, the results for the other variables remain virtually 
unchanged.  
 





This paper reexamined the costs and benefits of multiple banking relationships using a 
panel data set for Japanese small and medium-sized firms over the period 2000-2002. 
By employing the Hausman-Taylor estimator, this paper attempted to consider the 
correlation between unobservable firm characteristics (unobservable firm quality) and 
multiple banking relationships that previous studies have ignored.   
The main results can be summarized as follows. First, a positive relationship between 
the number of banking relationships and the cost of credit is observed even after 
controlling for firm quality. Second, multiple banking relationships have a positive 
effect on the availability of credit for financially constrained firms. These results imply 
that financially constrained firms forge multiple banking relationships in order to be 
certain of having access to credit, even if this guarantee raises the overall cost of credit. 
These results contradict the empirical findings of Petersen and Rajan (1994) and 
Harhoff and Körting (1998) that a concentration of banking relationships leads to less 
credit rationing, suggesting that the hold-up problem does not to apply to small 
business financing in Japan. Third, less credit is available when firms’ first bank is 
fragile. Fourth, less credit is extended to financially constrained firms when firms’ first 
bank is a city bank, indicating larger banks are reluctant to supply credit to smaller, 
riskier firms. These findings imply that small and medium-sized firms are vulnerable to 
liquidity shocks to their banks and the consolidation of large Japanese banks may have 
a further negative impact on small business financing.   
This paper could be extended in several directions. One area that could be examined 
is the link between banks’ characteristics and firms’ choice of single over multiple 
banking relationships. Another possible extension would be to try to measure the 
closeness of a firm to its bank by some other means, such as the length of the 
relationship or the physical distance between the firm and the bank. These issues are 
left for future research.     
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 20Table 1.A  Summary statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25
th percentile Median 75
th percentile
Firm characteristics
Loan interest rate paid by the firm minus short-term prime rate (%) 
a 78695 1.183 (1.201) 0.491 0.974 1.580
Sales growth  (∆Sales)/total assets (t-1) 78695 -0.011 (0.300) -0.135 -0.010 0.110
Debt/total assets  78695 0.759 (0.164) 0.663 0.796 0.885
Tangible fixed assets/total assets 78695 0.274 (0.184) 0.125 0.252 0.398
    Operating profit/interest (t-1) 78695 3.931 (7.769) 0.580 1.700 4.670
Total assets (¥ million) 78695 2145.22 (2970.35) 560 1129 2415
Distress dummy 
b 78695 0.244 (0.429) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Current assets/current liabilities 78695 1.487 (0.839) 1.020 1.260 1.660
Total outstanding loans amount/total assets 78695 0.413 (0.203) 0.258 0.415 0.564
Cash flow/total assets 78695 0.054 (0.092) 0.009 0.025 0.071
Sales/total assets 78695 1.518 (0.814) 0.964 1.344 1.867
(Notes payable trade+accounts payable trade)/total assets 78695 0.212 (0.175) 0.077 0.171 0.306
(Notes receivable trade+debtors' accounts receivable trade)/total assets 78695 0.220 (0.178) 0.060 0.200 0.336
Firm age (in years) 78695 35.674 (14.603) 25 35 47
Firm is incorporated 
c 78695 0.984 (0.125) 1 1 1
Stock listing dummy 
d 78695 0.017 (0.128) 0 0 0
Bank relationship characteristics 
Number of banking relationships 
e 78695 3.987 (1.835) 3 4 5
Government affiliated financial institutions for small business 
f 78695 0.529 (0.499) 0 1 1
The first bank is a city bank 
g 78695 0.408 (0.491) 0 0 1
Credit market competition 
Credit market concentration (%)
 h 75877 44.20 (12.60) 35.40 45.10 52.61
Bank fragility
The first bank's non- performing loan ratio (%) 78694 9.56 (3.45) 7.410 9.266 10.674
a  The interest rate is calculated as the interest paid divided by the total outstanding amount of loans (measured in %). The short-term prime rate is also measured in %.
b The dummy takes one if the firm was in financial distress within the last three years.
c The dummy takes one if the firm is incorporated and zero otherwise.
d The dummy takes one if the firm's stock is traded on the stock market.
e The number of banking relationships with non-government banks, i.e. banking relationships with government-affiliated banks are excluded.
f The dummy takes one if the firm borrows from one of the government-affiliated financial institutions for small business.
g The dummy takes one if the borrower’s main  bank is a city bank.
h Credit market concentration (%) is defined as the lending share of the three largest banks in the prefecture where the firm is headquartered.
21Table 1.B  Industry distribution
Industry Number of observations
Manufacturing 21522
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery 102
Mining 200
Construction 22766
Electricity, gas, and water 107
Transportation and communication 2045
Wholesale trade  25102
Retail trade 1656
Other financial institutions 38
Real estate 1567
Services 3590
Number of observations are firm-year observations.
22Model (I) Model (II) Model (III)
Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
Firm characteristics
Tangible fixed assets/total assets  (X2) -0.648 (0.071) -9.12 *** -0.641 (0.071) -9.05 *** -0.647 (0.073) -8.89 ***
Sales growth   (X1) -0.052 (0.009) -5.9 *** -0.028 (0.009) -3.03 *** -0.027 (0.009) -2.91 ***
Current assets/current liabilities (X1) -0.085 (0.007) -11.3 *** -0.080 (0.007) -10.74 *** -0.083 (0.008) -10.79 ***
log(total assets) (X1) -1.178 (0.023) -51.71 *** -1.175 (0.023) -51.74 *** -1.171 (0.023) -50.29 ***
log(1+firm age) (X1) 0.708 (0.268) 2.64 *** 0.671 (0.269) 2.49 ** 0.753 (0.267) 2.83 ***
log(1+firm age)
2 (X1) -0.055 (0.050) -1.11 -0.049 (0.051) -0.98 -0.063 (0.050) -1.27
Firm is incorporated (Z1) -0.054 (0.403) -0.13 -0.051 (0.422) -0.12 0.094 (0.395) 0.24
Stock listing dummy (Z1) -2.456 (0.565) -4.34 *** -2.492 (0.592) -4.21 *** -2.465 (0.568) -4.34 ***
  Operating profit/interest (t-1) (X2) -0.007 (0.001) -11.69 *** -0.007 (0.001) -10.73 ***
Distress dummy (X2) 0.019 (0.012) 1.66 * 0.021 (0.012) 1.75 *
Bank relationship characteristics 
The first bank is a city bank (Z1) -0.335 (0.141) -2.38 ** -0.330 (0.147) -2.24 ** -0.318 (0.143) -2.22 **
Number of banking relationships (Z2) 1.868 (0.137) 13.62 *** 1.884 (0.143) 13.19 *** 1.908 (0.140) 13.65 ***
Government-affiliated financial institutions for small business (Z2) -5.941 (1.207) -4.92 *** -6.130 (1.264) -4.85 *** -6.256 (1.229) -5.09 ***
Credit market competition variable
Credit market concentration (X1) 0.001 (0.001) 1.24
Constant 5.352 (0.805) 6.65 *** 5.478 (0.833) 6.58 *** 5.087 (0.771) 6.6 ***
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 78695 78695 75877
Number of groups 34330 34330 33088
Wald chi2 2830.32 2992.11 2823.64
Test statistics




Hausman specification test of HT model 
b
 *** Significant at the 1% level.
 ** Significant at the 5% level.
 * Significant at the 10% level.
Table 2. Determinants of firms' cost of credit
The dependent variable is the percentage point spread between the loan interest rate paid by firms and the short-term prime rate. The coefficients are estimated by the Hausman and Taylor
estimator. The vectors X1, X2, Z1, and Z2 contain time-varying exogenous, time-varying endogenous, time-invarying exogenous, and time-invarying endogenous variables, respectively. The
lower and upper 1% tails of the distribution of the financial variables, such as total assets, the tangible fixed assets/total assets ratio, the current assets/current liabilities ratio, sales growth, and
the operating profit/interest ratio, are trimmed. Each regression includes industry dummies, prefecture dummies, and year dummies.
a The test statistics is χ
2  with the test of the null hypothesis: unobservable firm effects are uncorrelated with regressors.
b The test statistics is χ












23Table 3. Estimation results of  the disequilibrium model
Coef. Std. Err. t
Supply equation
Tangible fixed assets/total assets 0.3286 (0.0065) 50.42 ***
    Operating profit/interest (t-1) 0.0004 (0.0001) 5.65 ***
Reciprocal of total assets 6762.50 (1643.38) 4.11 ***
Current assets/current liabilities 0.0468 (0.0011) 41.89 ***
log (GDP) 1.0027 (0.0370) 27.10 ***
Demand equation
Sales/total assets -0.1320 (0.0044) -30.03 ***
Cash flow/total assets -0.4050 (0.0101) -39.90 ***
Net trade credit/total assets -0.3021 (0.0044) -68.70 ***
Reciprocal of total assets 38658.70 (1159.34) 33.35 ***
Loan interest rate paid by the firm minus short- term prime rate -0.0285 (0.0003) -84.22 ***
 (∆Sales)/total assets -0.0162 (0.0005) -32.46 ***
log (GDP) -0.2237 (0.0159) -14.11 ***
S. D. of supply equation 0.0590 (0.0002) 282.57 ***
S. D. of demand equation 0.0519 (0.0001) 376.28 ***
 ρ 0.9862 (0.0036) 275.07 ***
Number of observations 70171
Log likelihood  104390
 *** Significant at the 1% level.
The dependent variable is the first-differenced value of the total outstanding loan amount/total assets. All variables in this table are first-
differenced. The loan interest rate paid by the firm minus the short-term prime rate is measured in %. ρ is the correlation coefficient between
supply and demand errors. The estimation method is maximum likelihood estimation.
24Table 4. Credit availability
Model (IV) Model (V) Model (VI)
Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z Coef. Std. Err. z
Firm characteristics
Predicted demand for total outstanding loan amount/total assets (X2) 37.482 (1.369) 27.38 *** 37.211 (1.405) 26.49 *** 37.210 (1.404) 26.5 ***
Debt/total assets  (X1) 68.048 (1.979) 34.38 *** 68.269 (2.061) 33.13 *** 68.203 (2.057) 33.16 ***
Current assets/current liabilities (X1) 2.212 (0.116) 19.08 *** 2.168 (0.120) 18.11 *** 2.176 (0.120) 18.17 ***
log(total assets) (X1) -11.177 (0.535) -20.9 *** -11.421 (0.555) -20.58 *** -11.401 (0.553) -20.61 ***
log(1+firm age) (X1) 21.672 (5.214) 4.16 *** 19.365 (4.698) 4.12 *** 19.458 (4.689) 4.15 ***
log(1+firm age)
2 (X1) -2.889 (0.793) -3.64 *** -2.528 (0.715) -3.53 *** -2.557 (0.714) -3.58 ***
Tangible fixed assets/total assets  (X2) 33.691 (1.626) 20.73 *** 34.077 (1.701) 20.04 *** 34.081 (1.700) 20.05 ***
    Operating profit/interest (t-1) (X2) -0.002 (0.013) -0.15 -0.002 (0.013) -0.17 -0.002 (0.013) -0.17
Distress dummy (X2) -0.058 (0.190) -0.3 -0.088 (0.195) -0.45 -0.089 (0.195) -0.46
Firm is incorporated (Z1) -1.512 (1.765) -0.86 -1.905 (1.804) -1.06 -2.004 (1.791) -1.12
Stock listing dummy (Z1) -19.483 (2.917) -6.68 *** -19.892 (2.957) -6.73 *** -19.721 (2.933) -6.72 ***
Bank relationship characteristics 
Number of banking relationships (Z2) 18.040 (1.252) 14.41 *** 18.502 (1.286) 14.38 *** 18.405 (1.277) 14.42 ***
Government-affiliated financial institutions for small business (Z2) -23.053 (7.394) -3.12 *** -25.138 (7.477) -3.36 *** -24.315 (7.409) -3.28 ***
The first bank is a city bank (Z1) -2.355 (0.617) -3.82 *** -2.178 (0.651) -3.35 *** -1.838 (0.656) -2.8 ***
Credit market competition
Credit market concentration (X1) 0.003 (0.012) 0.27 0.003 (0.012) 0.26
Bank fragility
The first bank's non- performing loan ratio (Z1) -0.220 (0.080) -2.74 ***
Constant 83.382 (11.174) 7.46 *** 87.712 (10.098) 8.69 *** 89.181 (10.124) 8.81 ***
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture dummy Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 29733 28635 28622
Number of groups 23613 22762 22750
Wald chi2 6439.03 5951.38 6006.94
Test statistics




Hausman specification test of HT model 
b χ
2(4)=0.95
 *** Significant at the 1% level.
The dependent variable is firms' total outstanding loan amount/total assets*100. The coefficients are estimated by the Hausman and Taylor estimator. The vectors X1, X2, Z1, and Z2 contain time-varying exogenous, time-varying
endogenous, time-invarying exogenous, and time-invarying endogenous variables, respectively. The lower and upper 1% tails of the distribution of the financial variables, such as total assets, the tangible fixed assets/total assets ratio, the
current assets/current liabilities ratio, and the operating profit/interest ratio, are trimmed. Each regression includes industry dummies, prefecture dummies, and year dummies.
a The test statistics is χ
2  with the test of the null hypothesis: unobservable firm effects are uncorrelated with regressors.
b The test statistics is χ
2  with the test of the null hypothesis: X1 and Z1 are uncorrelated with unobservable firm effects.
χ
2(11)=1125.33 
***
χ
2(3)=0.59
χ
2(12)=1109.02 
***
χ
2(4)=0.97
25